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Abstract
Background: There is widespread agreement that civil war obstructs efforts to eradicate polio. It is suggested that
Islamist insurgents have a particularly negative effect on vaccination programmes, but this claim is controversial.
Methods: We analyse cross-national data for the period 2003–14 using negative binomial regressions to investigate
the relationship between Islamist and non-Islamist insurgency and the global distribution of polio. The dependent
variable is the annual number of polio cases in a country according to the WHO. Insurgency is operationalized as
armed conflict between the state and an insurgent organization resulting in ≥25 battle deaths per year according
to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme. Insurgencies are divided into Islamist and non-Islamist insurgencies. We
control for other possible explanatory variables.
Results: Islamist insurgency did not have a significant positive relationship with polio throughout the whole period.
But in the past few years – since the assassination of Osama bin Laden in 2011– Islamist insurgency has had a strong
effect on where polio cases occur. The evidence for a relationship between non-Islamist insurgency and polio is less
compelling and where there is a relationship it is either spurious or driven by ecological fallacy.
Conclusions: Only particular forms of internal armed conflict – those prosecuted by Islamist insurgents – explain the
current global distribution of polio. The variation over time in the relationship between Islamist insurgency and polio
suggests that Islamist insurgent’s hostility to polio vaccinations programmes is not the result of their theology, as the
core tenets of Islam have not changed over the period of the study. Rather, our analysis indicates that it is a plausibly a
reaction to the counterinsurgency strategies used against Islamist insurgents. The assassination of Osama bin Laden and
the use of drone strikes seemingly vindicated Islamist insurgents’ suspicions that immunization drives are a cover for
espionage activities.
Keywords: Polio eradication, Vaccination programmes, Civil War, Insurgency, Islamism, Taliban, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda,
Osama bin Laden, Political determinants of health
Background
In 1988 the Global Poliomyelitis Eradication Initiative
(GPEI) launched a global campaign to eradicate polio-
virus by the turn of the century through a programme of
mass immunization. Polio has not been eradicated, but
the GPEI has achieved remarkable results: in 1988 there
were more than 350,000 polio cases in over 125 countries,
while in 2014 there were 359 cases of wild polio in ten
countries [1–3]. Poliovirus has remained endemic in three
countries: Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In the past
couple of years polio has spread from endemic countries to
cause outbreaks in previously polio free countries: from
Nigeria to other countries in West Africa and the Horn of
Africa – there were 199 polio cases in Somalia in 2013–14
(the first since 2007); and from Pakistan/Afghanistan to
the Middle East – there were 38 cases in Syria and Iraq in
2013–14 (the first since 1999 and 2000 respectively). In
May 2014 the WHO declared the renewed spread of polio-
virus to be an “extraordinary event” and a “public health
emergency of international concern” [4].
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Empirical experience demonstrates that eradication is
possible. India was until recently the largest endemic
reservoir of polio – in 2009 it accounted for almost half
of the world’s polio cases – and was considered to be
the most difficult challenge for eradication [3, 5]. But
India has not had a polio case since 2011 and in 2014 it
was declared polio free. This success was the result of
two factors. First, new vaccines have been developed
against specific strains of the virus. These are particularly
effective in areas where sanitation is poor because bacteria
that infect the gut interfere with the body’s ability to
mount an effective immune response to older vaccines.
Second, a concerted effort by the Indian government, in
collaboration with the GPEI and other organizations, de-
ployed a large number of workers (more than 250,000 in
the state of Uttar Pradesh alone), and paid particular
attention to vaccinating children from migratory popu-
lations and in dangerous and remote areas [5]. The
eradication of polio in India removed any doubts re-
garding the feasibility of polio eradication. As Bruce
Aylward, WHO Assistant Director-General for Polio,
pointed out, “Now that India has become polio-free, we
have crossed… from our primary barrier being techno-
logical or biological feasibility to one of political and
societal will” [6].
The technical and biological factors that inhibit polio
eradication are well understood. The organisational fac-
tors are also understood [7]. The proximate cause of the
persistence of polio in some areas and new outbreaks in
previously polio free areas is that too few children are
vaccinated to stop the spread of poliovirus [8, 9]. Yet the
underlying political and societal factors that inhibit the
effective implementation of vaccination programmes
have attracted little systematic analysis and do not even
feature in assessments of risks of outbreaks [10]. There
is widespread agreement that civil war is associated with
disease in general [11] and barriers to polio eradication
in particular [1, 6, 12, 13]. Insurgency diverts resources
away from healthcare and public health programmes, dis-
rupts healthcare infrastructure and the organisation of
vaccination programmes, and leads to forced migration,
which spreads infectious disease and makes populations
hard to reach. Reports in newspapers and medical journals
have suggested that Islamist insurgents have a particularly
negative effect on polio because they deliberately under-
mine the efficacy of polio immunization campaigns by
spreading misinformation that they are a conspiracy to
sterilize Muslim populations, which increases the likeli-
hood that parents will refuse vaccinations [8], and carrying
out targeted violence and boycotts – often legitimised
by these rumours – that reduce the ability and willing-
ness of polio workers to operate in particular areas
[12]. Some accounts argue that this reflects Islamists’
adherence to Islam and rejection of non-Islamic influences,
which makes them deeply antagonistic towards non-
Muslims and the West in particular [14]. More nu-
anced interpretations suggest that Islamist insurgents’
animus towards eradication programs must be under-
stood in the context of their interaction with domestic
political rivals and international actors [15, 16]. Islamic
scholars note that there is no religious basis for oppos-
ition to polio immunisation and suggest that the pri-
mary reason for failure of eradication is the presence
of conflict [17].
The first major conflict between Islamists – albeit
non-violent Islamists – and polio campaigns occurred in
2003, when the leaders of several northern-Nigerian
states banned vaccination programmes following ru-
mours that they were a Western conspiracy to render
Muslim children infertile [9, 16, 18]. The boycott lasted
a year and was a major setback for polio eradication. It
resulted in a global polio outbreak that affected 20 coun-
tries, accounted for 80 % of the world’s polio cases at the
time, and cost more than US$500 million to control
[18]. In Pakistan, resistance to polio campaigns began a
few years later: in 2007 militants banned vaccination
programmes in the North West Frontier Province due to
similar fears [19]. The boycott was accompanied by tar-
geted violence against polio workers – most notably the
assassination of the head of the government’s vaccin-
ation campaign in Bajaur Agency in 2007. Some ob-
servers argue that Islamist insurgents in Pakistan have
become increasingly hostile to polio vaccinations in the
past couple of years. These accounts stress the CIA’s use
of a fake hepatitis immunisation programme to collect
DNA from Osama bin Laden’s family members before
his assassination in 2011. This seemingly vindicated
insurgents’ suspicions that immunization drives are a
cover for espionage activities [6, 9, 20]. In addition, the
increased use of drone strikes in northwest Pakistan by
the United States is said to have amplified Islamist
insurgents’ enmity to polio vaccination campaigns be-
cause the insurgents suspect that polio workers were
carrying out surveillance in order to identify targets for
drone strikes [2, 6, 21, 22]. As a result an influential
leader of the Pakistani Taliban in North Waziristan
banned polio vaccination programmes in areas under
his control in summer 2012 [20, 21]. This is said to
have led to a steep increase in the number of polio
cases in the area [20, 21]. It should be noted, however,
that other influential Islamist clerics in Pakistan op-
posed the ban, issuing Fatwas that encouraging parents
to immunize their children against polio and other dis-
eases [23]. In addition, Boko Haram has reportedly car-
ried out several similar attacks on polio workers in
northern Nigeria [9, 24]. There have also been alleged
attacks in Afghanistan, although these are much less
frequent [25]. It should be noted, however, that when
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the Taliban were in power between 1995 and 2001 they
fully supported the GPEI. They continue to support
polio campaigns but the diffusion of ideas from Pakistan
means that some insurgents are hostile to vaccination
programmes and many parents refuse to vaccinate their
children [9, 26, 27].
Based on the analysis outlined above we generate three
testable hypotheses. The first relates to the widely held
conviction that civil war in general increases the likeli-
hood that a country will be affected by polio. It is argued
that the violence and disruption of armed conflict un-
dermines the ability of polio workers to carry out mass
vaccination programmes, as well as causing a more gen-
eral public health crisis.
Hypothesis 1: Countries affected by non-Islamist in-
surgency will have a higher number of polio cases.
The second hypothesis considers the more contentious
argument that Islamist insurgency in particular increases
the likelihood that a country will be affected by polio. It
is argued that Islamist insurgents deliberately undermine
the effectiveness of polio immunization campaigns by
spreading misinformation and carrying out targeted vio-
lence and boycotts.
Hypothesis 2: Countries affected by Islamist insur-
gency will have a higher number of polio cases.
Thirdly, some observers argue that Islamist insurgents’
animosity towards polio vaccination programmes is the
logical result of Islamic theology. If this is the case we
would expect the hostility to be more or less constant to
reflect the fact that the theological tenets of Islam have
not changed over the past decade or so. Alternatively,
others stress the role of political dynamics. It seems
apparent that some Islamist insurgents have come to
realize that interrupting polio campaigns is a useful
strategy because it generates international attention
for the insurgents and enables them to force conces-
sions from their opponents. Moreover, it is argued that
Islamist insurgents’ enmity towards polio vaccination
programmes has intensified in recent years in response to
the counterinsurgency strategies used against them. The
increased use of drone attacks and the CIA’s use of a fake
immunisation program in the assassination of Osama bin
Laden seemingly vindicated Islamist insurgents’ suspicions
that immunization drives are a cover for espionage activ-
ities. This is said to have seriously compromised the
GPEI’s activities.
Hypothesis 3: The effect of Islamist insurgency on the
incidence of polio will be stronger after the assassination
of Osama bin Laden in 2011.
Methods
We analyse cross-national data to test the hypotheses.
This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
study to systematically analyse the relationship between
insurgency and the persistence of polio with quantitative
data. Until now our understanding of this topic is in-
formed by qualitative data. This is potentially problem-
atic for two reasons, one general, the other specific to
Islamist insurgency. First, it is plausible that many of the
conditions that increase the probability of insurgency
also make a country more likely to experience a polio
outbreak. In other words there may be spurious causal-
ity. Insurgency and polio are both more likely to occur
in less-developed societies because the opportunity cost
of being involved in insurgency is likely to be lower [28]
and the general health of the population tends to worse
and the opportunity cost of being involved in insurgency
is likely to be lower [29]. Second, the dominant narrative
that links Islamist insurgents to polio is associated with
Western commentators, many of whom see – implicitly
or explicitly – Islamist insurgents as enemies of Western
interests. It is possible that this narrative is “system-sup-
portive propaganda” aimed at disparaging Islamist insur-
gents and legitimizing military intervention [30].
Our dataset includes all countries with a popula-
tion >100,000 and covers the period 2003, the year
of the Nigerian boycott, to 2014. The dependent vari-
able is the number of wild polio cases as enumerated by
the WHO [3]. In the regressions we use the 3-year mean
of polio cases in a country. This flattens out year-to-year
fluctuations. It also better operationalizes the proposed
mechanism that links insurgency and polio: insurgency
and/or insurgents disrupt vaccination programmes, not
enough children are vaccinated, and this may lead to an
outbreak in the same year or subsequent years.
To code the key independent variable – whether or not
a country is affected by insurgency – we use the Uppsala
Conflict Data Programme Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD)
[31]. Civil War is defined as a conflict between the state
and opposition groups in which there were 25 or more
battle deaths in a calendar year. The ACD lists the main
opposition groups in each conflict but we code whether
they are Islamist or not ourselves. We define Islamist
insurgents as groups that use Islam to legitimize their ac-
tivities and are seeking to overthrow the state and replace
it with an Islamist state. All other opposition groups are
coded as non-Islamist insurgents. For more information
on the coding of insurgency see the Additional file 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the proportion of polio cases that
occurred in countries affected by Islamist and non-
Islamist insurgency between 2000 and 2013. In the
early-2000s the vast majority of polio cases occurred in
countries that were affected by non-Islamist insurgency.
There was a decline in polio cases in countries affected
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by non-Islamist insurgency throughout the period to vir-
tually none by 2010. Conversely, until 2008 countries af-
fected by Islamist insurgency accounted for a very small
proportion polio cases. From 2008 the total number of
polio cases in the world began to fall sharply. Concomi-
tantly, the number of polio cases occurring in countries
affected by Islamist insurgents increased markedly. By
2010 the majority of polio cases occurred in countries
affected by Islamist insurgency.
We use negative binomial regression to test and quan-
tify the relationship between insurgency – both Islamist
and non-Islamist – and polio. We choose negative bino-
mial regressions because our dependent variable is count
data and the conditional distribution of the dependent
variable is over-dispersed, making Poisson regression
unsuitable [32]. We are primarily interested in cross-
sectional regressions because we want to investigate
whether the determinants of polio change over time.
Nevertheless we present the results of time-series ana-
lyses in the Additional file 1.
We control for other possible explanatory variables in
order to test whether the relationship between
insurgency and polio is spurious. First, we control for
per capita GDP as both insurgency [28] and disease [29]
are more likely to occur in less developed countries. Sec-
ond, countries with large populations are ceteris paribus
more likely to experience more polio cases and insur-
gencies. We therefore control for the total population.
Third, we control for the proportion of the total popula-
tion that live in rural areas because insurgency is more
likely to occur in rural areas where the state has less of a
presence [28] and it is more difficult for polio
immunization workers to reach rural areas where trans-
port and health infrastructure are often poor [8, 9].
Fourth, as polio is more likely to occur among popula-
tions where the general level of health is worse we con-
trol for the Infant Mortality Rate. All these variables are
coded from World Development Indicators. Fifth, as
polio is infectious, a country is more likely to be affected
by polio if it was affected by polio in the previous year.
We add a variable for the number of wild polio cases a
country experienced in the previous year. The popula-
tion and previous polio cases variables are log trans-
formed to make their distribution less skewed.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main
variables.
Results and discussion
In this section we set out the results of the negative bi-
nomial regressions. We report incidence rate ratios
(IRRs), the exponentiated regression coefficient. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
In Table 2 the data for the independent variables are
from 2003 – when Islamists in Nigeria first advocated a
boycott of polio vaccination programmes – and the
dependent variable is the mean annual number of polio
cases in the period 2003–05. There was a significant
negative relationship between Islamist insurgency and
polio (models 1,3,5,7). In model 7, when we control for
other explanatory variables, countries affected by Islamist
Fig. 1 Insurgency and polio cases, 2000-13
Table 1 Overview of main variables
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Polio cases (absolute) 1920 6.471 58.058 0 1122
Polio cases (3 year mean) 1920 6.387 50.153 0 911.333
Islamist insurgency 1920 .030 .171 0 1
All Insurgency 1920 .108 .311 0 1
Non-Islamist insurgency 1920 .139 .346 0 1
GDP per capita (000) 1895 11.648 17.504 .108 113.739
Total population (log) 1920 15.639 1.928 11.378 21.060
Infant Mortality Rate 1910 31.894 28.738 1.7 134.4
Rural population % 1820 44.664 23.672 0 91.077
Polio in previous year (log) 1920 .239 .931 0 7.378
We all include all countries with a population > 100,000 for the period 2003–2012
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insurgency had five times fewer polio cases than those that
were not (p = .019). In model 3 there is a positive signifi-
cant relationship between non-Islamist insurgency and
polio (IRR = 6.618, p = .049). But non-Islamist insurgency
loses significance when we control for other possible
explanatory variables (model 7). This suggests that the
relationship between non-Islamist insurgency and polio
is spurious: it is not insurgency, but variables that in-
crease the likelihood of insurgency such as a large
population and low level of development, that increase
country’s susceptibility to polio. Of the control variables,
total population and infant mortality rate have a signifi-
cant positive relationship with polio (models 4–7).
In Table 3 the data for the independent variables are
from 2012 and the dependent variable covers 2012–2014.
Model 8 demonstrates that, when we do not control for
other possible explanatory variables, a country that was af-
fected by Islamist insurgency in 2012 will have 110 times
more polio cases than a country that is not affected by
Islamist insurgency (p < .001). In model 9 a country that
was affected by any type insurgency in 2012 will have 49
times more polio cases (p < .001). In model 10 we disaggre-
gate the key independent variable: only Islamist insurgency
is significant. In model 12, when we control for other pos-
sible explanatory variables, the IRR for Islamist insurgency
falls but remains significant at the .1 % level (IRR = 30). In
model 13 all insurgency is significant (p < .001) but the IRR
(12.5) is smaller than for Islamist insurgency. This sug-
gests that Islamist insurgency in particular, rather than
insurgency in general, is driving the relationship. This is
confirmed when we disaggregate insurgency into two
dummy variables in model 14. Islamist insurgency is sig-
nificant (IRR = 28, p < .001) but non-Islamist insurgency
is not significant. Of the control variables, total population
and infant mortality rate have a significant positive rela-
tionship with polio (models 10–14).
Table 2 Negative binomial regression testing the relationship between Islamist insurgency in 2003 and polio cases in 2003–05
(3-year mean)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Islamist insurgency .198** (.094) .242* (.133) .192* (.143) .194* (.136)
Insurgency 5.720 (5.460) .533 (.533)
Non-Islamist insurgency 6.618* (6.342) .601 (.635)
GDP per capita (000) .875 (.124) .871 (.133) .854 (.151) .856 (.150)
Total population (log) 4.223*** (1.177) 4.086*** (1.133) 5.003*** (2.013) 4.730*** (2.001)
Infant Mortality Rate 1.056*** (.016) 1.054** (.016) 1.059*** (.016) 1.057*** (.016)
Rural population % 1.051 (.032) 1.054 (.033) 1.050 (.030) 1.052 (.030)
Previous polio 2.746*** (1.071) 3.100** (1.118) 3.274** (1.281) .932 (229) .972 (.243) .841 (.258) .885 (.296)
Observations 192 192 192 182 182 182 182
We report incidence rate ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. Constants are calculated but not reported
*p < .05 (5 %), **p < .01 (1 %), ***p < .001 (0.1 %)
Table 3 Negative binomial regression testing the relationship between Islamist insurgency in 2012 and polio cases in 2012–14
(3-year mean)
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Islamist insurgency 110.078***
(96.727)
126.742***
(112.982)
29.695***
(18.510)
27.889***
(17.521)
Insurgency 48.686***
(41.103)
12.503***
(7.829)
Non-Islamist insurgency 2.766 (2.966) .659 (.754)
GDP per capita
(000)
.394* (.162) .588* (.119) 523*** (095) .582* (.112)
Total population
(log)
3.329*** (1.014) 2.528** (.727) 2.572** (795) 2.589*** (.693)
Infant Mortality
Rate
1.045 (.027) 1.026 (.014) 1.032 (.018) 1.026§ (.025)
Rural population % .920* (.032) .967 (.024) .935* (.025) .969 (.025)
Previous polio 2.525*** (.614) 2.573*** (.557) 2.580*** (.659) 1.343 (.293) 1.445 (.281) 1.486* (.269) 1.417 (.282)
Observations 192 192 192 183 183 183 183
We report incidence rate ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. Constants are calculated but not reported
*p < .05 (5 %), **p < .01 (1 %), ***p < .001 (0.1 %), §p = .05 (5 %)
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In Table 4 we replicate models 7 and 14 for the years
between 2003–5 and 2012–14 in order to better under-
stand how the relationship between insurgency and polio
has changed over time. Several trends can be observed.
First, there was significant negative relationship be-
tween Islamist insurgency and polio at the start of the
period (model 15), no significant relationship with polio
throughout most of the period, but a significant posi-
tive relationship with insurgency for the last 3 years of
the period (models 22–24). It is interesting to note that
the first point at which there was a significant positive
relationship between Islamist insurgency and polio was
the first time that the dependent variable included
polio cases that occurred after the assassination of bin
Laden in 2011. Second, non-Islamist insurgency is sig-
nificant at the 5 % level in two periods – in 2006–08
and 2007–09 (models 18–19). Nevertheless, it seems
likely that this relationship is the result of an ecological
fallacy. In the period 2006–09 India accounted for 70 %
of polio cases in countries affected by non-Islamist insur-
gencies. But there does not appear to be a causal relation-
ship between insurgencies – which occurred in Kashmir,
the north-east and the central tribal belt – and polio, which
was most prevalent in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar [33, 34].
The relationship between Islamist insurgency and polio
does not appear to be the result of an ecological fallacy
(see Additional file 1).
Third, in all regressions there is a positive significant
relationship between total population and the number of
polio cases (models 15–24). This reflects the fact that,
ceteris paribus, countries with larger populations are
likely to have more polio cases. Fourth, in all the regres-
sions there is a positive significant relationship between
infant mortality – a proxy for the general health of the
population – and the number of polio cases (models
15–24). If a country’s Infant Mortality Rate (deaths per
1000 live births) decreased by one it would expect to see
a fall in the number of polio cases of between 3 and
10 % depending on the year when all other variables are
held constant. Fifth, there is a significant positive rela-
tionship between the proportion of the population living
in rural areas and the polio at the beginning of the
period under analysis (models 16–18). Model 15 is close
to being significant at the 5 % level (p = .077). But rural
population is not significant in later periods with the ex-
ception of model 22 where there is a significant negative
relationship. It seems likely that recent improvements
in vaccines and vaccine programmes have allowed
undermined the challenges the rural locations posed to
eradication.
We performed a variety of robustness tests on the re-
sults presented in this section. First, we ran the regressions
with an alternative operationalization of Islamist insur-
gency that uses a threshold of more than 1000 deaths per
year. The results were similar, demonstrating that our
analysis is robust to different definitions of insurgency.
Second, we included additional control variables. For
example, we reran the regressions for the periods in
which Islamist insurgency had a positive significant re-
lationship with polio with a variable for the log popu-
lation of Muslims in a country. The variable was
significant in all models when Islamist insurgency was
not included. But when Islamist insurgency is included
the proportion of Muslims loses significance. This re-
flects the fact that Islamist insurgents’ attitudes to-
wards polio should be understood in the context of
Islamists’ interaction with domestic political rivals and
international actors. Third, we set out qualitative data
to demonstrate that the relationship between Islamist
insurgency and polio is not the result of an ecological
fallacy. The robustness tests do not alter our main
conclusions. For more details of the robustness tests
see the Additional file 1.
Discussions and conclusions
The main barriers to polio eradication are no longer
medical or technical because of improvements in vac-
cines and the administration of vaccines. Polio persists
and continues to spread because of political and social
barriers that stop the effective implementation of polio
eradication programmes. This paper analysed cross-
national data to investigate the relationship between dif-
ferent forms of insurgency and polio between 2003 and
2014. Islamist insurgency did not have a significant posi-
tive relationship with polio throughout the whole period.
But in the past few years Islamist insurgency has had a
strong effect on where polio cases occur. This is because
Islamist insurgents deliberately undermine the efficacy
of immunization campaigns by spreading misinforma-
tion and attacking polio workers. The evidence for all
types of non-Islamist insurgency is less compelling. First,
in some cases the relationship is no longer significant
when we control for variables that operationalize the
level of development in a country. This suggests that the
relationship is spurious. Second, in a few cases non-
Islamist insurgency was significantly related to polio
even when we controlled for other explanatory variables
but this relationship was the result of an ecological fal-
lacy. This challenges the view that armed conflict in
general is driving the persistence and re-emergence of
polio in some areas [1, 6, 12, 13]. Notwithstanding this,
it makes sense as, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no evidence that non-Islamist insurgents intentionally
aim to disrupt polio eradication programmes. Left wing
insurgents, such as the Communist Party of India
(Maoist), aim to generate mass support by improving
public health in areas under their control and do not
harm polio workers [35]. On the other hand, insurgents
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Table 4 Negative binomial regression testing the relationship between Islamist insurgency and polio (3 year mean), 2003–2014
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
2003–5 2004–6 2005–7 2006–8 2007–9 2008–10 2009–11 2010–12 2011–13 2012–14
Islamist insurgency .194* (.136) .218 (.197) .305 (.226) 1.596 (1.130) 1.156 (.586) .335 (.271) .183 (.203) 49.313*** (50.731) 10.359** (8.454) 27.889*** (17.521)
Non-Islamist insurgency .601 (635) 1.291 (1.429) .392 (.289) 2.867* (1.114) 4.895* (3.073) .436 (.440) .430 (.512) 2.634 (1.522) 1.058 (.732) .659 (.754)
GDP per capita (000) .856 (.150) .949 (.039) .918 (.049) .990 (.026) .311** (.121) .927* (.061) .807 (.106) .878 (.062) .730* (.113) .582* (.112)
Total population (log) 4.730*** (2.001) 3.229* (1.544) 4.066*** (1.619) 1.733 (.594) 2.478*** (.619) 1.936** (.402) 1.486* (.265) 2.065** (.446) 2.227* (.686) 2.589*** (.693)
Infant mortality (per 1000) 1.057*** (.016) 1.049** (.017) 1.043* (.019) 1.036* (.015) 1.059*** (.013) 1.042*** (.008) 1.072*** (.019) 1.103*** (.024) 1.044** (.017) 1.026§ (.025)
Rural population % 1.052 (.030) 1.058* (.028) 1.061* (.030) 1.034** (.011) .975 (.021) 1.055 (.031) .990 (.028) .938* (.159) .960 (.021) .969 (.025)
Polio cases in previous year (log) .885 (.296) 1.025 (.234) 1.036 (.183) 2.100*** (.381) 1.332 (.211) 1.417* (.246) 1.450 (.373) .743* (.159) 2.116*** (.387) 1.417 (.282)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 183 183 183 183 183
We report incidence rate ratios. Standard errors are in parentheses. Constants are calculated but not reported
*p < .05 (5 %), **p < .01 (1 %), ***p < .001 (0.1 %), §p = .05 (5 %)
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that have narrower political or economic objectives have
little interest in generating support through social medi-
cine but are not opposed to vaccination campaigns.
Our analysis supports the position that Islamist insur-
gents’ hostility towards polio vaccination programmes
negatively affects the implementation of the GPEI. This
is not to say that we advocate a renewed “War on Ter-
ror” to complement the war on polio. The negative con-
sequences of military intervention would far outweigh
the possible public health gains – even if it precipitated
the eradication of polio. The question of why Islamist
insurgents are hostile to polio vaccination programmes
can only be answered definitively with qualitative re-
search. Nevertheless, our findings contribute some evi-
dence to this debate. If Islamist insurgents’ antagonism
to polio vaccinations was driven by their theology we
would expect it to be constant throughout the period
studied because the basic theological tenets of Islam
have remained more or less constant. This is not the
case. We noted above that Islamists are not inevitably
hostile to polio eradication campaigns. For example,
when the Afghani Taliban were in power they fully sup-
ported the GPEI and even al-Qaeda did not attempt to
disrupt it [9], and Fatwas issued against polio workers in
Pakistan have led to counter fatwas by other religious
authorities urging vaccination [23]. It seems apparent
that some Islamist insurgents have come to realize that
targeted violence and boycotts against polio programmes
is a useful strategy: it can be used to generate inter-
national attention for the insurgents and to force con-
cessions from their opponents. What is more, it appears
to be that case that some Islamist insurgents have be-
come increasingly hostile towards polio vaccination
campaigns as a result of the counterinsurgency strategies
of domestic governments and international actors. The
increased use of drone attacks and the CIA’s use of a fake
immunisation program in the assassination of Osama bin
Laden have seemingly vindicated Islamist insurgents’ sus-
picions that immunization drives are a cover for espionage
activities and seriously compromised the GPEI’s activities.
These are important lessons for Western policy makers,
international organizations, and governments in the Middle
East and North Africa as they deliberate how best to coun-
ter the growing influence of Islamist insurgents.
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